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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CAROL JOAN STONE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
VAL FRANKLIN STONE,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No
10698

Respondent's Brief on Appeal
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by a father to modify the terms
of a divorce decree by changing the custody of four
minor children from the mother to the father.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Stewart
M. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial District, who
found all issues in favor of the mother, and refused to
g-rant the change of custody.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests that the decision of the trial
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court be affirmed, and that respondent be awarded
reasonable attorney's fees for the expenses of defending
this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Carol Joan Stone and Val Franklin Stone were
married on March 13, 1952. There were four children
born of that marriage, Randall, presently age 13,
Richard, age 11, and twins, Bret and Bart, age 8.
In 1961, difficulties arose in the marriage. During
that time, the father admits striking the mother and she
was either knocked down or she slipped and fell down,
and also admits beating the children with clothes
hangers (R. 133). The father admits that he knew his
actions were upsetting to the mother, and that he also
made repeated threats to take her children from her,
knowing that it was terribly upsetting to her (R. 135 ).
A divorce was granted to the mother July 21, 1964,
on the grounds of mental cruelty, and it was found by
the court that the father had treated her cruelly, had
become unaffectionate toward her, had told her he no
longer loved her, had refused to live with her, and this
had been caused by no fault of hers. In spite of the
fact that the father had been repeatedly requested to
discontinued such conduct he refused to do so (R. 8).
Prior to the divorce, the father and his new wife were
working at the same place and frequently he would pick
her up on 21st South Street and take her to work
(R. 104).
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The new Mrs. Stone was divorced in 1963 and has
three children, two girls, age 13 and 7, and a boy age 9.
Iu April, 1965, the father married the new wife and took
on the obligations of her three chlidren. He admits that
from that time on, he never offered to help his ex-wife
in the raising of his children, except for the payment of
support (R. 137).
The father brought this action less than a year after
his new marriage, and alleges that the mother is mentally ill. He admitted, however, on cross-examination,
that he knew that she had a physical problem all of the
time ( R. 137). He knew that his wife had been examined
by her family doctor and was told that she had a blood
sugar problem called hypoglycemia. Hypoglycemia is
an abnormally diminished content of glucose in the blood,
giving the same general symptoms associated with sugar
diabetes (R. 187-9). The father testified that he knew
that the mother was taking pills for the problem, and
had told him that she was feeling much better prior to
his filing the action (R. 137).
The father admits that the mother has done a good
job in caring for the children. He did not contest the
divorce or attempt to obtain custody of the children at
that time. The father further stated on cross-examination that the mother was doing a good job raising the
children until approximately September 1965 (R. 146-7).
He further stated that since the action was initiated in
l\Iarch 1966, she has been doing a real job (R. 146). The
only period the father complains about is the Fall of
Hl65 and January and February 1966 (R. 147). He
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further admitted that the children were <loing well in
school, that they were active in Sunday School and Scout
activities, and that he knew the mother had taken the
children two or three times a week on picnics to the park,
and swimming, and had gone fishing and camping over
night on several occasions with them (R. 146).
Though the father claims that the mother was mentally incompetent from September 1965, to January 1966,
the evidence in no way substantiated this claim. After
Dr. Anderson diagnosed her problem as hypoglycemia
and prescribed drugs, the temporary difficulty of the
mother was corrected. All of the witnesses, both medical
and neighbors, testified that the children were properly
cared for and never neglected by the mother. Dr. Jack
Tedro, a physician and surgeon, specializing in psychiatry, testified that a person with hypoglycemia would
not be able to recognize members of his own family at
times, and that a person could believe that he had a
tape recorder in his head and still do a pretty good job
with the family without having the children suffer under
these conditions (R. 191-3). Dr. Tedro further testified
that the mother had done a worthwhile job with the
children in the last six years, and it would be very disturbing to her if the children were taken from her
(R. 200). Dr. Tedro never at any time said that Mrs.
Stone had schizophrenia as represented in appellant's
brief, nor is there any evidence showing that he recommended hospitalization in the L.D.S. Hospital psychiatric
ward as appellant has claimed.
Four neighbors substantiate the fact that the chil4

dren were never neglected by their mother. Mrs.
l\Iarjorie .Tones, a neighbor of six years, testified that
only once did the mother state to her that she had a
difficult time with the children, and that she could think
out things clearly, that the only difficult period was
between October 1965 to February 1966. She further
testified that prior to that time, things were perfectly
11ormal, and since February, the mother appeared perfectly normal. She further testified that the children
always apeared to be normal, well dressed, well fed,
clean, well adjusted in the neighborhood, and active in
church and scout work (R. 170-172).
Mr. Teddy Jones testified that he had lived right
next door to the mother for six years, that he had observed the children, and that they were not in any way
different from any other children in the neighborhood,
that they were well clothed and clean (R. 177).
Jeanine Snider, a neighbor of five years, testified
that the mother had done an excellent job with the children. She testified that she was aware that Carol had
had a diabetic problem during October 1965 to March
1966, and that she was taking pills for this problem. She
observed that the children were not hungry, that they
were properly dressed, ~well adjusted, clean, and not
dirtier than any other children in the neighborhood. She
also testified that she knew they were active in church
and considered Mrs. Stone a good mother (R. 182-5).
Madelon Close, also a neighbor of six years, who
had lived directly across the street from the mother
testified that the onlv difficulty she observed was from
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October 1965 to January 1966, and that she had been
much better since January 1966. She further testified
that the children were dressed like all other children in
the neighborhood, and that she had never observed the
children being hungry or neglected in any way (R. 161).
All of the children testified concerning the fine care
they received from their mother. Randall, age 13, testified that he knew his mother loved him, that she fed him
well, and that he had a good breakfast, lunch and dinner
every day (R. 215). Ricky, age 11, stated that his mother
had taken them swimming and fishing many times, and
that his mother stays home and takes care of him
( R. 218-20). The two younger children, age 7, also testified that their mother fed them well, kept them clean,
and washed them (R. 222-3).

In spite of the excellent care given to these children,
the father requested the court to grant him custody of
his four sons and place them in a new home with limited
supervision. The father's new wife testified that she
had worked continuously since high school, and that her
children had been cared for five days a week in nursery
schools, or by someone coming into the home and caring
for them (R. 89). She further testified that her seYenyear old child had not been living in her home from
January until June, 1966, and gave the reason as an
illness she had in January (R. 91). Her mother had
taken the child to ease her work load (R. 96). The child
was enrolled in school in Pleasant Grove in .Jan nary am!
remained there the rest of the year (R. 95). The new
wife, however, continued to work, having lost only one
6

week from her employment at Litton Industries for the
illness. The new wife testified that she was presently
alowing her 13-year-old daughter to tend her children
at home, and this notwithstanding the fact that she and
her husband leave for work at 7 :15 A.M. and do not
return until after 4 :30 P.M. (R. 90). This required the
children to get themselves ready for school, prepare
their own breakfast and go to school without the aid of
either parent, and return without their parents being
home (R. 90). The new Mrs. Stone also testified that
she had been nervous prior to her marriage with Mr.
Stone and had sought medical attention for aches and
pains in her points and hands the entire year proceeding
the trial. She testified that she sought medical attention
at least once a week for the past year (R. 96-99). The
new Mrs. Stone also testified that she would have to
continue to work indefinitely as she did now, and this
in order to take care of present bills and obligations
(R. 104). Her nine-year old child, Richard, also has a
health problem and requires private tutoring (R. 92).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AFTER AN AW ARD OF CUSTODY IS
MADE BY THE DIVORCE COURT, A
CHILD UPON REACHING THE AGE OF
TEN YEARS DOES NOT HAVE AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO CHANGE THE ORDER
OF CUSTODY.
The record in this case discloses that the two older
boys, Randall, age 12, and Richard, age 11, while testi-
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fying that they loved their mother and that she took
good care of them, indicated that they would prefer to
live with their father because they hadn't seen him for
so long and wanted to spend more time with him. Thus
the legal question arises as to whether such preference
is absolutely binding upon the trial court. This issue
involves an interpretation of ~30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated 1953 which provides as follows:
"When a decree of divorce is made the court may
make such orders in relation to the children,
property and parties, and the maintenance of
the parties and children, as may be equitable;
provided, that if any of the children have attained the age of 10 years and are of sound
mind, such children shall have the privilege of
selecting the parent to which they will attach
themselves. Such subsequent changes or new
orders may be made by the court with respect
to the disposal of the children or the distribution
of property as shall be reasonable and proper.''
Contrary to what appellant states in his brief, this
is not a case of first impression in the State of Utah, the
law already having been clearly decided, both in the case
of an original divorce proceeding and in the case of a
subsequent order for modification.
With respect to the original decree, the court in a
split decision in Smith vs. Smith, 15 Utah 2d 36, 386
P.2d 900, found that it was obliged to construe the
statute literally, and that the child's decision was bind·
ing upon the court.
With respect to a subsequent modification of the
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deC'ree, which is the case here, the court in the case of
Anderson vs. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132, also
interpreted the statute literally and held that the decision
of the child is not absolutely binding upon the trial court.
In so holding, the court stated as follows:
''The italicized portion thereof, as set out hereinabove, is a limitation on the power of the court to
award custody of a child 'at the time the decree
is made' to a parent not of the child's choice,
where both parents are found to be fit to have
such custody. The proviso modifies the first portion of the sentence of which it is a part. As to
change of custody subsequent to the decree, the
statute states that orders relative thereto shall
be dictated by what is 'reasonable and proper'."
Not only would the position of appellant herein require
an over-ruling of the Anderson vs. Anderson case, but
such position is contrary to good reason and common
sense. Justice Crockett in his dissenting opinion in the
Smith vs. Smith case, supra, makes the following comment:
"Under such a rule, parents already too deeply
immersed in woes because the family is breaking
up would have them added to by having to compete with each other for the children's choice.
Without elaborating thereon it is easy to see the
hazzards to them and to the child this would
create. Such a battle might well go to the more
unscrupulous parent, who may not be above
poisoning the child's mind against the other; or
resorting to C'oercion; or showering him with illadvised gifts or favors. Even more damaging
would be the subjecting of a child to such pressures and making him a pawn in the contest of
the spouses for his custody. It is extremely doubt9

ful that under tmch circumstances a child of that
age would have the stability and judgment to see
through the maze of troubles and make a wise
choice. In some instances it would be cruel to
subject him to it and wholly unrealistic to regard
his choice as absolute.''
The dangers that Justice Crockett refers to are far more
real and apparent in the change of custody case than in
the case of the original divorce. At least in the latter,
once the decision is made, the parties can accept it and
live with it, while in the former, the child would in many
cases be under constant pressure from either one parent
or the other to change his mind. It would be cruel indeed to place a child in such a position.
Often it is necessary to discipline a child; or to
deprive a child of something he desires; or require the
child to do things in the furtherance of his education
which the child does not wish to do. In these matters a
child under the law has a duty to obey his parents. Certainly it is not in the best interests of either society or
the child to put an immature 10-year-old child in such
a position that he can be absolutely relieved of his duties
and obligations to a parent upon his own choice, or that
he be placed in a position where he can use that choice
as a threat against a well-meaning parent to make demands upon the parent, or to be relieved of unpleasant
responsibilities which would otherwise be for his best
good.
There is no reason for the Anderson vs. Anderson
case to be over-ruled.
10

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO CHANGE
THE ORDER OF CUSTODY.
This court has held on many occasions that the
paramount consideration in determining the question of
custody of children is the welfare of the children; further, that the trial court has broad discretion in making
that determination, and its ruling will not be upset unless
there is plain abuse. Walton vs. Coffman, 110 Utah 1,
169 P.2d 97; Anderson vs. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172
P.2d 132; Sampsell vs. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P.2d 550;
Smith vs. Smith, 1 Utah 2d 75, 262 P.2d 283; Steiger vs.
8teiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 418; Johnson vs. Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 P.2d 16; Briggs vs. Briggs, 111
Utah 418, 181 P.2d 223.
As is documented by the statement of facts herein,
the witnesses overwhelmingly testified that Mrs. Stone
was a good mother; that she took excellent care of the
children; and that the children were all well-adjusted in
their school, church and other activities. Because of the
overwhelming nature of this testimony from appellant's
own witnesses, respondent found it unnecessary to put
on further testimony, and rested her case without calling
any further witnesses.

It is understandable why the trial court found that
it was in the best interests of the four minor children
that they remain under the fine care and supervision
they had received from their mother, who spends her
11

entire time in the care of the chilclren. Particularly is
this understandable ·when the alternative would be to
place the children in the home of a step-mother who iR
employed and away from her home during the day,
thereby leaving the boys, some of which are in their
early teens, in the unwholesome position of being left
alone ·with children of the step-mother, among which are
girls of their own age. While respondent does not ·wish
to question the integrity or the moral character of ~Ir.
Stone or his new wife, nevertheless it would seem unwise
to remove the children from a home in -vvhich they are
well-adjusted and well cared for, and place them in a
home where their future adjustment is an unknown
factor.

It is true that a mother has no absolute right to the
custody of minor children. However, this court has held
on numerous occasions that in the absence of a showing
that the mother is immoral or unfit, and all other things
being equal, preference should be given the mother in
awarding custody. Johnson vs. Johnson., 7 Utah 2d 263,
323 P.2d 16; Steiger vs. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2J
418; Cooke vs. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 Pac. 83; Briggs vs.
Briggs, 111 Utah 418, 181 P.2d 223. Appellant has madr
no showing whatsoever which would rebut this presumption in favor of the mother, or otherwise shown that
the trial court abused its discretion. The bold claim of
mental incompetency of the mother is absolutely unsupported by the evidence, and respondent would invite
the court to carefully scrutinize the record in this regard.
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO
ERROR IN REFUSING TO REQUIRE RESPONDENT TO SUBMIT TO A MENTAL
EXAMINATION.
Appellant in this case insisted on going to trial as
soon as posible, and the pre-trial order (R. 35) was
drafted in such a manner so as to set forth as issues for
the trial (1) whether the plaintiff was unfit to retain
custody of the children, and (2) whether the plaintiff
should be required to submit to a mental examination
under Rule 35, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellant
then was willing to proceed to trial on the merits, and
the question of the mother's fitness was fully litigated.
The appellant now, after having had his day in court,
says that the trial court should have ordered a mental
examination. He is thus placing the trial judge in the
rather strange position of having to rule on a question
involving pre-trial discovery after the case is all over.
Never at any time prior to the trial was the preliminary
issue noticed for hearing, and the appellant is now simply
attempting to get two shots at his case.
Even though appellant has had his day in court, the
trial court did not preclude a future mental examination.
'fhe trial court in its memorandum decision (R. 46) after
having found that there was no evidence to show that
plaintiff was mentally incompetent or otherwise unfit,
stated that if it appears at some future time that a
psychiatric or physical examination is necessary, application for the same could be made to the court. Thus the
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door was left open, and it is difficult to see how the trial
judge could have been more fair to the appellant.
Rule 35, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
the court "may" order a party to submit to a mental or
physical examination ''only on a motion for good cause
shown.'' Cases construing the identical Federal rule
have unanimously held that the granting or denying of
such a motion is a matter which lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Piterto Rico vs. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149;
Butcher vs. Crause, 200 F.2d 576; Teche Lines vs. Boyette, 111 F.2d 579; The Italia, 27 F.Supp. 785. There is
no showing in this case of any abuse of the trial court's
discretion.
POINT IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
MADE SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT
DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF
DEFENDANT.
Appellant complains because the trial court did not
make findings of fact as specific as appellant would like
to have had them. This does not prejudice his case in
any manner whatsoever. Where the same objection was
raised in the case of Cawley vs. Cawley, 59 Utah 80, 202
Pac. 10, the court stated as follows:
''Plaintiff, however, insists that the District
Court erred in not making specific findings respecting the charges in his complaint. It is true
that the court omitted to make specific findings,
and merely found that the statements contained
in the complaint were untrue, and upon that find-
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ing dismissed the complaint; yet it is also true
that, in view of the fact that divorce proceedings
are highly equitable, in equity cases, where the
evidence is all certified to this court, as was done
in this case, we may make findings or direct what
they shall be, or in case the findings are insufficient or incomplete, make them conform to the
evidence. In view, therefore, that under the
evidence in this case the findings would necessarily have to be against the plaintiff, he was not,
nor could he have been, prejudiced by the omission of the court to make specific findings.''
If the court sees any merit to requiring detailed findings
of fact, the trial court can be required to amend them
accordingly. However, in light of the fact that the entire
record is before the court, it is difficult to see what
purpose this would accomplish.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN REFUSING TO FIND THE
MOTHER IN CONTEMPT, NOR DID IT REFUSE THE FATHER REASONABLE VISITATION RIGHTS.
The original Divorce Decree of the parties gave the
father "reasonable" rights of visitation (R. 5). Appellant complains that he was refused visitation privileges on Wednesday evenings, and that such refusal
constitutes contempt of court on the part of the mother.
There was never an order granting the father visitation
privileges on Wednesday evenings, and in the absence
of a showing that appellant was deprived of "reasonahle" visitation privileges, there is no basis for con tempt.
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The decree of the trial court expandPd defendant's
privileges to include eYery other weekend, two >Yeeks in
the summertime, plus additional visitation privileges at
times convenient to the children and the parties (R. 59).
It is difficult to understand how this can be considered
as "limited" visitation rights and an ahuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
When one examines the complete record in this case,
it can readily be seen that the trial judge exercised wisdom in his discretion in refusing to change the order of
custody to the father. The decision simply is not the
result of an unsavory collusion on the part of a prejudiced trial judge and a plaintiff's attorney who resorts
to "brainwashing" tactics as appellant has implied in his
brief and would have this court believe.
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as
cited herein, respondent respectfully requests that the
decision of the trial court be affirmed.
Respondent further requests that she be allowed
costs and a reasonable attorney's fee for responding to
this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
NEILD. SCHAERRER
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Pla.intiff-Responrle1d
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